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Abstract
In this paper, we study the citation decision of a scientific author. By citing a
related work, authors can make their arguments more persuasive. We call this the
correlation effect. But if authors cite other work, they may give the impression
that they think the cited work is more competent than theirs. We call this the
reputation effect. These two effects may be the main sources of citation bias. We
empirically show that there is a citation bias in Economics by using data from
RePEc. We also report how the citation bias differs across regions (U.S., Europe
and Asia).
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D81
Keywords: citation bias, correlation effect, reputation effect, signal, strategy,
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1. Introduction 
Scientific progress is achieved cumulatively by individual efforts of scientists. Scientists keep 
doing research even if they can hardly expect to get paid much for it.  Presumably, to most 
scientists, the driving force of their research would not be monetary rewards, but receiving 
recognition for it. 
Since Shepard’s Citations initiated as legal citators in 1873, ISI (Institute for Scientific 
Information) introduced various citation indices have been used to measure a scientist’s 
contribution1 to his discipline.  As a result, those indices have significantly influenced 
tenure, promotion and reappointment evaluations as well as other decisions in universities or 
research institutions, like merit pay or endowed chairs.  These decisions are taken under the 
assumption that citations reflect the true quality of the researcher. What if there were some 
strategic aspects in citations? We investigate here whether there is some distortion in citation 
patterns.  
For this purpose, we examine the correlation between an author’s rank and the average 
rank of those he or she cites.2 Figure 1 shows this.  If there were no citation bias, the citation 
line would be horizontal.  No matter who cites, the pool of cited works would be similar.  
                                            
1 The word “contribution” is rather ambiguous in this context.  Note that quality and influence cannot be 
identified, although they may be correlated.  Then, it is not clear whether contribution refers to quality or 
influence. 
2 We use data from the RePEc (Research Papers in Economics), which is a decentralized database of working 
papers, journal articles and professional books.  For more details on RePEc, see http://repec.org/ or Krichel 
(2000). Detailed variable descriptions are given in Table 1. 
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However, a positive slope of the citation line drawn in Figure 1 suggests that there is a bias in 
the citation pattern.  In particular, the figure shows that authors tend to cite other authors 
whose ranks are higher than themselves.  The goal of this paper is to explain the 
phenomenon of such an upward bias in citation.  
Our argument in explaining an upward citation bias starts from our fundamental view on 
citation, namely, “Citing is a strategy.”  It is told that many scientific authors experience the 
embarrassing moment of finding their work not being cited in closely related works by others. 
Why have the latter authors failed to cite predating related works at the expense of 
embarrassing or even offending someone?  There must be a gain from doing so.  Scientific 
authors decide whether to cite a related work strategically by comparing the cost and the 
benefit of citing it. The decision is not entirely taken with honesty or scholarly conscience in 
mind.3 
The benefit that an author can get from citing a related work is apparent. Above all things, 
it makes his argument more persuasive.  Readers will believe that his argument is more 
likely to be correct or believable if it is supported by a closely related argument that was made 
                                            
3 For example, Palevitz (1997) writes about his experience where he found a paper omitting to cite his work 
even though the paper is on a subject almost identical to that covered in his work and one of the authors knew 
about his work when they wrote the paper.  The reader must surely have had similar experiences.  Also, 
Armstrong and Wright (2007) demonstrate using a well cited article in Marketing that it is most often cited 
inappropriately (not at all, not in the proper context, or with an erroneous understanding of the article). For 
example, we cite Armstrong and Wright (2007) based on its abstract, but we have not read the paper. 
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independently by someone else.  We call this the correlation effect, because the effect is 
mainly due to the correlation between the truth of the two arguments.  Clearly, the 
correlation effect of citing is larger, that is, his argument will be perceived to be more 
convincing, if the related argument was advanced by a more competent author.  For example, 
we say “Confucius said that ...,” but we seldom say “My friend Charles said that ...,” to try to 
convince others of his argument.   
This consideration may create some cost in citing a work by others.  To elaborate, if an 
author cites someone else's work, it may give the impression that he thinks that the cited 
author is more competent than himself.  This may make an author reluctant to cite the work 
by others, especially by less established authors.  This cost of citing is generated mainly 
through damaging his reputation.  So, we will call this the reputation effect.  By omitting to 
cite a related work of less established authors deliberately, he can establish the reputation that 
he at least thinks himself more competent than the author he ought to cite but did not cite.  
Thus, an author’s failure to cite someone else's related work has a vaulting effect in the sense 
that he intends to jump in reputation by using someone else as a vaulting tool.  There are 
also minor costs of citing.  An author cannot cite all the related works. It is burdensome both 
to the author and to readers.  Moreover, it is costly to search for all the relevant works.4 
                                            
4 We neglect here the strategy of citing journal editors or potential referees, something we cannot control for in 
our empirical work. 
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This paper consists of a theoretical part and an empirical part.  In the theory part, we 
build a simple model to explain an author's citation decision.  As we argued above, we 
identify two main effects, the correlation effect and the reputation effect.  By the correlation 
effect, an author tends to cite only competent authors whose claims are likely to be correct, 
because citing a related claim by less competent authors may make his own claim look less 
likely to be true.  Also, the reputation effect makes an author, particularly who is less reputed, 
even more selective in citing.  This is because for an author whose academic ability is not 
yet widely known to cite a less competent author may give a bad signal about his ability.  
The two effects lead to citation bias.  
In the empirical part, we show using data from RePEc that there does exist a citation bias 
in Economics.   The most difficult part in this empirical research is to choose a proxy 
variable for the reputation of an author.   For this purpose, we distinguish two individual 
ranking variables RANK and RANK_NW.   The former refers to the overall rank of an author 
in RePEc using a set of 31 different criteria and the latter refers to his rank only determined 
by the number of authored works weighted by a simple impact factor.  Thus, the variable 
RANK_NW does not take the number of citations into account.  The variable RANK, which 
reflects the number of citations, is used as a proxy for an author’s reputation.   
A striking fact that we obtain is that, the citation pattern of similarly ranked authors in 
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terms of RANK_NW can be U-shaped with respect to RANK.  This implies that the average 
rank of authors that an author cites may decrease as the author is less reputed, and then finally 
increase if the reputation of the author falls very low. This seems to support that the reputation 
effect exists, since it can be interpreted as the correlation effect dominated by the reputation 
effect for authors with intermediate reputation.  This is not observed for all author groups, in 
particular the pattern is only declining for the top authors. 
As a rough proxy for an author’s recognizability, we may alternatively use his seniority. 
We find a more severe citation bias among junior authors, that is, juniors are more selective in 
citations, which shows an evidence of the reputation effect. We also observe that the number 
of citations per article is significantly different across regions (U.S., Europe and Asia) 
conditional on the variable RANK.  This can be viewed as another evidence of citation bias. 
   Our paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we set up a model and provide a 
theoretical analysis of an author's citation decision.  To separate the correlation effect from 
the reputation effect, we consider two distinct cases when an author's ability is fully known to 
all other potential authors and when his ability is known only to a limited number of them. 
Section 3 contains the empirical analysis supporting the results derived in Section 2.  
Concluding remarks and some suggestions follow in Section 4. 
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2. Model  
To explain citation bias, we consider the following model.  A scientific author (author 1) 
makes a claim 1ω  in his writing.  This claim can be either true or false.  The prior 
probability (or belief) that 1ω  is true is )1,0(1 ∈μ .  We can interpret 1μ  as the ability of the 
author.  The author decides whether to cite a related claim 2ω  by another author (author 2).  
The probability that 2ω  is true is )1,0(2 ∈μ . 
We assume that the author is a risk-neutral Bayesian decision-maker, that is, he 
maximizes the posterior probability (or belief) that his claim is true.  Thus, he decides to cite 
2ω  if it increases the posterior probability that 1ω  is true.  Let TTTP αωω === )|( 21  
and FFFP αωω === )|( 21 .  We assume that 2/1, >FT αα , i.e., the two claims are 
correlated.5  We also assume that Tα  and Fα  are common knowledge. 
 
2.1 Complete Information  
Consider the case that 1μ  and 2μ  are both common knowledge.  If author 1 cites 2ω , the 
posterior belief that claim 1 is true is  
).1)(1(
)()|()()|()|(
22
22122121
μαμα
ωωωωωωωω
−−+=
===+=====
FT
FPFTPTPTTPTP
 
Since the probability that T=1ω  with no citation is 11 )( μω == TP , he chooses to cite 2ω  
                                            
5 This assumption implies that we do not consider negative citations saying, “I claim 1ω , although author 2 
claimed 2ω  that looks contrary to my claim.” 
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if and only if  
            ).1)(1( 2211 μαμαμμ −−+≡< FT 6                                (1) 
 For the following, we assume that )1,0(1 ∈μ .  Inequality (1) implies that a less capable 
author is more likely to cite another of given capability. The intuition is quite clear. A less 
capable author can increase the posterior belief that his claim is correct if he cites the claim by 
a reasonably competent author, whereas a more capable one only decreases the posterior 
belief by citing the claim.  We call this the correlation effect of citation. 
Rewriting inequality (1) leads to our result of selective citation in the case of complete 
information. 
 
Proposition 1:  When 1μ  is publicly known, author 1 cites 2ω  if and only if 
.
1
11
22 −+
−+≡=
FT
F
αα
αμμμ  
Proof.  Note that 1>+ FT αα . Thus, it is clear that inequality (1) is equivalent to 
22 μμ > .  
 
Proposition 1 suggests that an author cites only the claim made by competent authors.  
He is reluctant to cite an unreliable author's claim ( 22 μμ < ).  The intuition behind this result 
                                            
6 Strictly speaking, it is more sensible to interpret iμ  as the probability that the public believe iω  is true. 
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is as follows.  Given reasonably high Tα  and Fα , if 2μ  is large, 2ω  is likely to be 
correct, which in turn implies that 1ω  looks correct by citing 2ω  because of high Tα .  
Similarly, if 2μ  is small, 2ω  is likely to be false, implying that citing 2ω  makes 1ω  look 
false because of high Fα . 
Also, let us consider the specific case that ααα ≡= FT .  If 2/12 >μ , the citation benefit 
gets larger as α  increases, so that author 1 is more willing to cite 2ω .  In an extreme that 
1≈α , he cites as long as the cited author’s known ability is higher than his own.  However, 
if 2/12 <μ , the citation has a worse effect as α  increases.  The intuition is clear.  As the 
two claims are more closely related, the truth of 2ω  is more likely to imply the truth of 1ω , 
while the falseness of 2ω  is more likely to imply the falseness of 1ω .  When μμμ ≡= 21 , 
inequality (1) holds if 2/1<μ  but does not if 2/1>μ , implying that an incompetent author 
( 2/1<μ ) always cites the claim by a comparable author, while a competent author does not. 
 
2.2 Incomplete Information  
To identify the second effect of citation, consider the alternative case that 1μ  is known only 
to a limited proportion of the public.  Thus, we assume that a proportion λ  of the 
population knows 1μ  for )1,0(∈λ , while the rest do not know 1μ  but only know its 
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distribution )( 1μG , where )( 1μG  is defined over (0, 1).7  We will call 1μ  the type of 
author 1.  We retain the assumption that 2μ  is common knowledge.8 One can imagine that 
author 2 is a widely known scholar, while author 1 is a junior scholar who has just entered 
academics. 
Under incomplete information, the citation decision of an author may convey some 
meaningful information about 1μ .  Since the citation decision depends on 1μ  in the model 
of complete information, the public may be able to infer the author's unknown ability from his 
citation decision.  Taking this into account, an author with unknown ability may cite more 
selectively to pretend to be more capable.   We call this the reputation effect of citation.  
To show the reputation effect formally, we resort to the usual solution concept, the weak 
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), which requires the belief of the public to be updated 
from the prior belief according to Bayes' law whenever possible.  Our interest is confined to 
the equilibrium outcome that some types of author 1 cite while other types do not.9 In this 
equilibrium, there must be a type who is indifferent between citing or not citing 2ω  under 
incomplete information. Let this type be 1~μ .  Then, we have 
 
                                            
7 For example, it is usual that the ability of a freshly minted Ph. D. is known only locally. 
8 When 2μ  is unknown, risk-averse authors should be less willing to cite him than the author whose μ  is 
known.  This is a situation quite plausible in reality, as our empirical analysis will show, but it is beyond the 
scope of our theoretical analysis. 
9 This is a semi-separating equilibrium outcome.  We will not consider the uninteresting pooling case where no 
types cite. 
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Proposition 2: (i) Author 1 cites 2ω  if )(~11 λμμ ≤ , while he does not if )(~11 λμμ > , (ii) 
11 )(~ μλμ < , and (iii) )(~1 λμ  is strictly increasing in λ . 
Proof.  See appendix. 
 
This proposition says that a more severe citation bias occurs due to the reputation effect.  
A less widely known author tends to be more reluctant to cite others.  The intuition goes as 
follows. Citing has two effects.  On one hand, it directly increases the credibility of his claim 
(correlation effect), but, on the other hand, it has an indirect signaling effect; adjusting the 
belief of his ability downwards (reputation effect).  Thus, an author decides whether to cite 
or not by taking the two effects into account.  So, the citing decision of an author with a very 
high 1μ  (and a very low 1μ  respectively) will never (hardly respectively) be affected by the 
incomplete information, but an agent with a medium range 1μ  , especially close to 1μ  , 
who would cite under complete information would rather opt not to cite under incomplete 
information if he takes account of the extra reputation effect. 
In this model, an author’s attempt to signal by omitting to cite deliberately gives the same 
reputation benefits across types, but is more costly to a type of lower 1μ  because he is giving 
up providing more convincing argument to informed readers.  Due to a difference in this 
signaling cost, separation is possible. 
 11
 
3. Empirical Evidence 
We use citation data from the RePEc.  As of Februry 2007, the RePEc database holds 
close to 450,000 items of interest in Economics and related fields. In addition, 12,205 authors 
are registered through the RePEc Author Service,10 each having contact information and a list 
of publications catalogued in RePEc. Finally, the Citations in Economics (CitEc) project11 
performs citation analysis on items in RePEc, which then allows to constitute rankings of all 
registered authors. 
An author's overall rank is determined by taking a harmonic mean of his ranks in 31 
different rankings based on citations, impact factors and paper downloads, removing the best 
and worst ranks.12 From 12,205 registered authors, we collect the information given in Table 
1. (Insert Table 1 here.) 
In Figure 1, we plot the RANK_CITED variable with respect to the author's rank (RANK).  
We exclude the authors whose RANK_CITED values are zero. It can indeed happen that none 
of the cited authors are registered, or that references could not be found for any of the author’s 
works, especially if he has few of them. Thus 9,127 of 12,205 authors are considered in the 
                                            
10 See http://authors.repec.org/ or Barrueco Cruz, Klink and Krichel (2000). 
11 See http://citec.repec.org/ or Barrueco Cruz and Krichel (2005). 
12 For details, see http://ideas.repec.org/top/ or Zimmermann (2007). 
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simulation.  The figure reveals that the citation pattern line is not horizontal,13 that is, the 
citation pattern is dependent on the author's rank (RANK), implying that citation bias does 
exist. (Insert Figure 1 here.)  To show that the slope of the citation pattern line is 
significantly different from zero, we estimate the following regression equation; 
._ 10 eRANKCITEDRANK +∗+= ββ  
Here, the estimate for 1β  is 0.05 with a standard error of 0.002 and thus we can reject 
the hypothesis that .01 =β  Also, a positive slope of the citation pattern line is consistent 
with our theoretical result that authors tend to cite other authors with higher ranks than their 
own. 
To examine the citation pattern from another angle, we draw 91 rank groups by assigning 
about 100 authors to each group according to their ranks. For each author, 1 is given if the 
RANK_CITED value is larger than the RANK value14 and otherwise, 0 is given.  Then, the 
average of the indicator values is computed for each rank group.  The graphical result is 
reported in Figure 2.  (Insert Figure 2 here.) 
With no citation bias, the graph would decline smoothly. In Figure 2, however, the graph 
falls rapidly and we clearly observe that the averaged indicator values are recorded as zero 
                                            
13 The citation pattern line is plotted by using the Lowess smoothing method. 
14 This implies that the selected author's rank is higher than the average rank of his cited authors. 
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from the 24th rank group.15 This means at least that the authors in the middle range are 
unlikely to cite the authors with lower ranks than their own. Accordingly, Figure 2 is 
consistent with Proposition 2 saying that citation bias is more severe among less established 
authors if we interpret those authors with intermediate ranks as less established ones while 
interpreting the top ranking authors as established. 
To test the citation bias solely due to the reputation effect, we need a proxy for the 
reputation of an author.  We may think of several candidates for the proxy.   
First, we pay attention to the difference between RANK and RANK_NW.   We use 
variable RANK_NW as a proxy of the true ability of an author,16 and variable RANK for a 
proxy of his overall ability including his reputation.17 We group authors by RANK_NW 
assigning about 400 authors in each group, and take the upper 10% and 50% groups.  In 
Figure 3, we present two regression-fitted lines denoted by the dashed line (upper 10%) and 
the solid line (upper 50%). (Insert Figure 3 here.)   Interestingly, it is displayed that the 
dashed line shows the negative slope with respect to the proxy variable for an author’s 
reputation, RANK.  This suggests that a less reputed author is likely to cite high-ranking 
                                            
15 Approximately 2407th – 2518th ranked authors are allocated to the 24th rank group. 
16 An author’s performance in terms of journal publication can be a reasonable proxy for his ability insofar as 
the refereeing process in academic journals is fair.  See Kim and Park (2006) for the possibility of the unfair 
refereeing process especially in single-blinded journals. 
17 We can justify this choice of variable RANK for measuring the reputation as follows.  As in the argument in 
footnote 5, risk-averse authors are reluctant to cite an author whose ability is not widely known.  In fact, many 
authors seldom cite unfamiliar names.  So, RANK of a less reputed author is likely to be lower than his 
RANK_NW. 
 14
authors more selectively due to the reputation effect.  From the solid curve, it is predicted 
that the authors up to the 4000th show a negative slope, while those of lower ranks than the 
6000th show a positive slope.  This can be also interpreted as their reputation effect almost 
balanced with the correlation effect at the minimum point.  Overall, our theoretical result 
supports a U-shaped curve.18 
 Second, as an alternative proxy to the recognizability of an author, we use his seniority.  
More specifically, to distinguish the reputation effect from the correlation effect, we classify 
authors into two groups, seniors and juniors, 19   and then plot the relation between 
RANK_NW and RANK_CITED in Figure 4.   While positive slopes of the fitted lines 
represent the bias due to the correlation effect, a lower fitted line for juniors than for seniors 
clearly show that there is a bias due to the reputation effect.  In other words, juniors are more 
selective in their citations. 
Finally, we add the empirical evidence of the risk-avoiding effect informally discussed in 
footnote 8 by identifying bias towards citations of authors from prestigious institutions.  In 
fact, an author’s affiliation with a well known university helps getting his work widely 
recognized and frequently cited.  Testing the citation bias that occurs due to the author’s 
                                            
18 Table 2 shows that the observed shapes of two fitting curves in Figure 3 are supported by the regression 
model estimation. The quadratic regression model for the upper 50% indicates the positive and negative 
significance for the squared term, and the linear model for the upper 10% indicates the negative significance for 
variable RANK.  The squared term for RANK in the model with the upper 10% authors is estimated to be 
insignificant. (Insert Table 2 here) 
19 Here, we define junior authors by ones whose publication was within 3 years. 
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affiliation, we provide summary statistics in Table 3.  (Insert Table 3 here.) 
We find that citation bias exists, depending on the author affiliation.  Authors affiliated 
with institutions from the USA or Canada are more likely to be cited than those in other 
continents.   Of course, this may be due to their relatively higher rankings rather than due to 
citation bias.  To examine the citation bias controlled by the rank of authors, we propose the 
following regression model. Compared to the previous estimation model, we replace the 
RANK variable with the RANK_NW variable to avoid the simultaneity problem between  
AVE_CITING and RANK; 
,32__ 3210 ieAFFIAFFINWRANKCITINGAVE ++++= ββββ  
where AFFI2 (Europe) and AFFI3 (Others) are dummy variables for the affiliation regions. 
Considering that 50.1% of 11,599 new number authors have no cited records in the works of 
other authors, a Tobit model is employed as the estimation approach.  The coefficients and 
standard errors are reported in Table 4.  (Insert Table 4 here.) 
In this regression, we find that the RANK_NW variable is negatively significant.  After 
controlling the author rank, the region dummy variables are still negatively significant at a 5% 
level. Therefore, the empirical result supports the hypothesis that authors with US or Canada 
affiliations are more likely to be cited than authors with other regional affiliations. 
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4. Conclusion and Caveats 
In this paper, we provided a theoretical model of citation and tested the results empirically. 
Overall, the empirical results presented in this paper support the hypothesis that there is either 
individual-based or group (geography)-based citation bias.  In particular, we find evidence 
for the correlation effect, namely that authors prefer to cite better ranked authors to make their 
claim more legitimate. We also find evidence for the reputation effect, whereby authors cite 
more selectively to avoid a signal of incompetence when there is uncertainty about their 
competence.  
We acknowledge, however, that authors may also take consideration of other factors, for 
example psychological or political one in deciding to cite.  An author may cite someone’s 
work simply because he is a colleague or because he used to be the author’s advisor/student.  
Or, he may not cite a work just for the reason that he does not like the author personally.  
Although some citations are an outcome of such personal considerations, the inherent nature 
of the citation should not be to give a favor to someone, but to cite his work because it is 
relevant.    
One important feature in the citation decision that we neglected to mention in this paper is 
the network effect in a broad sense.  It is often reported that a small group of scholars give 
mutual favors by citing each other.  Also, some physicists recently have identified a hub 
 17
structure in scientific citation networks and explained it by using preferential attachment 
whereby a newcomer in a network is more likely to link to an author with more links, that is, 
more likely to cite an author who is more often cited.20 The preferential attachment, which is 
very crucial to a hub structure, can be interpreted as herding in an economic term,21 going like 
“an author tends to cite someone else simply because many people cite him.”  This may be 
another source of citation bias.  
Finally, it is impossible to establish whether another citation strategy is significant, 
namely hat of adapting citations to the intended outlet: citing editors or potential referees, 
even being asked by referees to cite them. One could argue that better established authors 
would give less in to such games or that editors in better journals may not allow such behavior, 
but this is only anecdotal evidence we cannot verify without dataset. 
To conclude, there is a significant citation bias in academic journals.  The academic 
tradition of evaluating an author in terms of RANK incorporating the number of citations 
clearly aggravates the bias.  On this ground, we believe that RANK_NW should be more 
often used to evaluate an author’s performance than RANK to mitigate the citation bias.  
 
                                            
20 Jeong et al. (2003), for example, identify the evidence of preferential attachment in the science citation 
network. 
21 See Banerjee (1992), and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) for informational explanations of 
herding. 
 18
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) Let I  be the set of 1μ  who does not cite in equilibrium. By the 
definition of 1~μ , we have  
),~()1)(1()|( 12221 μμαμαωω VTP FT =−−+≡=  
where )|()1()( 111 IEV μλλμμ −+= .  Then, since )( 1μV is increasing in 1μ , it is clear that 
)()|( 121 μωω VTP <=  for all 11 ~μμ >  and that )()|( 121 μωω VTP >=  for all 11 ~μμ < .  
Also, by the definition of 1μ , we have 121 )|( μωω == TP .  This implies that 
                                                 
)|()1(~ 111 IE μλμλμ −+= .                                           (2) 
Note that 11 ~)|( μμ >IE , because }~|{ 111 μμμ >=I .  Therefore, it follows that 11 ~μμ > .  
Total differentiation of (2) directly shows the monotonicity of )(~1 λμ  with respect to λ . 
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<Table 1: variable description> 
variable Description 
RANK Author’s overall rank  
RANK_NW 
Author’s rank determined by his number of works  
weighted by the simple impact factor of their series   
RANK_CITED 
Average rank of authors cited in this authors’ works: 
when several authors are ranked for a cited work,  
the highest rank is taken 
NW_CITING The number of works citing this author 
NW_WORKS The number of this author’s publications  
AVE_CITNG NW_CITING / NW_WORKS 
AFFI 
Author’s affiliation:  
for multiple affiliations, the first affiliation is chosen 
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< Table 2: Quadratic and linear estimation > 
Quadratic regression model: upper 50% group 
variable 
 
coefficient 
 
standard error t-value p-value 
RANK 
 
-0.556 
 
0.180 -3.08 0.002 
(RANK)2 
 
4.19e-05 
 
1.71e-05 2.45 0.015 
 
Linear regression model: upper 10% group 
variable 
 
coefficient 
 
standard error t-value p-value 
RANK 
 
-0.105 
 
0.034 -3.07 0.002 
 
 
<Table 3: Summary statistics> 
Affiliated region obs NW_CITING AVE_CITING 
USA & Canada 3,743 52.1 1.27 
Europe 6,394 11.42 0.39 
Others 1,462 5.98 0.27 
Note: 11,599 of 12,205 authors are considered and authors with no explicit affiliation are excluded.  
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<Table 4: Tobit model estimation> 
variable coefficient standard error t-value p-value 
RANK_NW -0.00066 0.00001 -60.76 0.000 
AFFI2 -0.438 0.0648 -6.76 0.000 
AFFI3 -0.452 0.105 -4.29 0.000 
 
logL 
 
-15536.89 
 
<Figure 1: RANK_CITED vs. RANK> 
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<Figure 2: Average of indicator values for each rank group> 
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<Figure 3: upper 10% and 50% RANK_NW groups> 
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<Figure 4: Seniors vs. Juniors> 
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